Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.
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History of Western Philosophy. Finally, what of the Buddhist religion? But there are several ways to negate objects [i. In such case, if it could be shown that the reason implied permanence, then the Buddhist’s own subject, i. PVin a et seq.: Because one doubts whether it is excluded from the dissimilar instances, namely, from entities which are of the nature of impermanence.
Thus there would be nothing but reciprocal contradiction. Now if the permanence which is the nature of pleasure, etc. He thus tries to eliminate camphor and silver by saying that there is no actual common acknowledgment of the word candra being applicable to such things, apart from some arbritrary, and hence ungrounded, isolated uses in treatises on perfumes.
Hence we prefer to understand It appears that he thought that the essential point was again that there were no acandra, i. On the recurrent theme that one dharmin has many dharmas, cf.
Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Devendrabuddhi’s introduction to k. We seem to have several pieces of evidence of uncertain weight for an earlier dating—e. Any interdiction upon them here [because of logical reasons such as sattva] is opposed. The PVV provides the following introduction to k.
Dharmakirti’s Pramanavini Scayah, 2. Words designate primarily mentally created fictions. This latter demand leads to a host of other requirements: And this [intention] is understood by means of those [contexts].
For example, contradictions such as saying that desire and other [passions] are the root of immorality and that bathing also annuls immorality.
Jackson – – Faith and Philosophy 16 4: Chi, in his Buddhist Formal Logic Chiwent several steps further and attempted to show that the Hetucakra, taken in its formal aspects, might present a number of interesting features to a modern logician.
The word svayam would be useless because that for which it was [supposedly] used was eliminated by the other [definition, dhafmakirti. There too, there is no opposition with regard to the object, i.
Tibetan topical outlines generally distinguish separate opposing positions in k. He begins by introducing verse 34 as follows: The Samkhya’s proposition that pleasure, etc.
Should he be one who acts without previous reflection, then his ground is just his wishes alone. It is important to note that in k.
The opponent’s argument thus, in a backhanded way, reinforces Dharmaklrti’s own fundamental positions. Gillon – – Mind Help Center Find new research papers in: And what makes any property what it is consists in the contribution it makes to the potential causal behaviour of what has it.
The way words link to dharmakieti is thus primarily explained through the existence of a causal chain from particular things to perceptions to thoughts pramznavarttika to the utterances of words—in short we have a type of causal xharmakirti of reference.
The states of mind could be individuated unproblematically, and so derivatively we could somehow perhaps individuate the concepts too without committing ourselves to a plethora of occult objects, one dharmakjrti each word. What [refutation dUsana ] would there be of the proponent in this case!
PVP has dor ba’i rgyu “which is a cause for a rejection. Epistemology and philosophy of language 2. They would stress that negative facts, like x not being blue, heavy, etc. The idea, then, is that camphor, etc.
Pramanavarttika – Wikipedia
Moreover, we can imagine a situation like that described in k. TS Tattvasamgraha of Santaraksita. There are two faults: What is the upshot if things are explained in this way? True, in his later works, viz.
At certain points what were factual matters become epistemic matters, and this even leads to interesting reorientations of the triple criterion. At most there is just the negative grouping of being distinct from everything which lacks the power, and that, as we know by now, is an apoha and not pramanavarftika real property.
Now, it is not so that words, which function purely by agreement, fail to apply anywhere. What was Dharmakirti up to here? When the truth of P i.